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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent increase in the number of publications, debates and public discourse about the displacement 
of people caused by environmental changes can be reasonably attributed to the alarming intensity of the 
situation. In the near future, the proliferation of environmentally forced migrants (EM) is expected to 
create tremendous socio-economic and political problems. In spite of the immensity of the problem, no 
official definition of this class of migrants has been established and no policy measures are adopted at 
the national and international level1.  
The absence of any real effort to define the status of environmental migrants is often linked to the 
deliberate effort not to include them in the class of (political) refugees and consequently grant them the 
protection provided by the Geneva Convention (Kibreab, 1997). Thus, the effort of the advocates of an ad 
hoc policy for the EM amounts to persuading the political community that those migrants should also be 
considered as persecuted (Myers, 1997, Conisbee and Simms,, 2003).This reasoning has found support 
in the prevailing political tendency to limit immigration flows.  
Another explanation given to this ‘agenda denial’ (Cobb and Ross, 1997) is related to the uncertainty of 
the phenomenon. All figures advanced on the displacement of millions of people cover periods as distant 
as 2025 or 2050 (Myers 2002). Many scholars remain sceptical and contest those numbers (Castles 
2002, Black 2001). They emphasise the absence of certainty about these apocalyptic scenarios and ask 
for more analysis of the complex factors behind them. Governments hesitate to engage in policy action in 
a context of uncertain long-term impacts. In response to this situation, more case studies are requested in 
order to prove the necessity for further consideration.  
However, the advocates of the asylum regime and the uncertainty of the future are not the only reasons 
for the difficulties in this agenda-setting process. A further explanation of failure appears to be much more 
complex and largely related to the specificity of the issue which involves different policy sectors. Each one 
                                          
1
 In order not to create confusion with traditional refugees, I use the terms environmental (forced) migrant and environmentally 
displaced persons. 
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of these sectors has its own rationality and its policy goals and priorities. Therefore, a compromise on 
problem definition and policy content becomes particularly difficult2.  
The first part of this contribution seeks to present the complex process of public problem definition. The 
second part proposes an analysis of the constraints imposed by the multi-sectoral aspect of the issue. 
The third part discusses the recent evolution of the international debate that restrictively defines the 
environmental migrant as a climate migrant. We suggest that this effort to define the identity of those who 
need protection paradoxically leads to postponement of any attempt to officially recognise 
environmentally displaced persons as an autonomous public problem and to propose specific policy 
measures. The final section breaks with the globalising and the restrictive definitional strategies outlined 
in the previous parts. It suggests a more pragmatic approach consisting of the use of present policy 
instruments in order to give different policy sectors the possibility to help environmentally vulnerable 
populations. This could be a first stage for further negotiations for a more integrated approach in the 
future.  
2. THE RUSSIAN DOLLS OR THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS  
Public problems are like Russian dolls that are enclosed within one another. Let’s take the example of the 
environmental migrants: Greenhouse gas emissions cause global warming. Global warming is a potential 
force for creation and/or expansion of deserts. This subsequently leads to loss of biodiversity, famine and 
forced migration. Migration generated by desertification can be defined as an autonomous public problem 
with further consequences like conflict, cultural and economic impoverishment in the departure regions, 
human and ecological vulnerability, etc. But it can also be perceived as a consequence of desertification.  
Greenhouse gases  Global warming Desertification  Migration Conflict, etc 
As Edelman (1991) suggests, very few situations are recognized as a public problem and get registered 
on the political agenda. The recognition of a problem does not occur automatically; it depends on various 
parameters not necessarily related to the gravity of the situation. Serious problems can remain far from 
the attention of governments, while others, perhaps less pressing, can be the subject of courageous 
measures. The official recognition of a problem means allocation of a budget, distribution of competences 
and designation of persons to blame and protect. The definition (or not) of a situation as a problem and its 
official registration (or not) on the agenda are purely political actions that involve the search for a 
compromise between multiple actors supporting different positions. To put it another way, problem 
definition is an issue of power, since it divides the social and public actors into winners (who profit from 
the recognition of the problem) and losers (who will lose material or symbolic resources) (Stone, 1997). 
For example, the recognition of environmental migrants as an autonomous problem will strengthen the 
positions of the agency asked to manage this problem, which will probably in turn have its budget and its 
personnel increased. It will also help people affected by the deterioration of the environment who will 
benefit from positive measures. On the other hand, this same recognition can prove harmful for the 
refugees. It may also meet the dissatisfaction of the polluters. 
When a situation becomes a public problem, it passes through a double definitional debate 
(Vlassopoulos, 2007). The first determines the causes of the problem and answers the question "what is 
the problem?". The second determines the consequences of the problem and answers the question "why 
does this situation constitute a problem?". The causes identify the measures to be adopted and the 
agents who have competence to implement them. Each reference to the consequences of the problem 
constitutes not only a justification legitimizing to differing degrees the intervention of political leaders ("we 
act to protect the citizens' health ", "we act to guarantee safety", etc), but also a means for the recognition 
of the authority of those who claim to have one or another type of competence.  
                                          
2
 This paper is based on observations and personal interviews with agents of the French and Indian administrations and the United  
 Nations (Geneva). I wish to thank them for having accepted to meet me and respond to my questions. 
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The multi-sectoral character of the issue of environmental migrants disturbs this double definitional 
process preventing its definition as an autonomous public problem.  
3. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING A MULTI-SECTORAL PROBLEM 
Since the El-Hinnawi (1985) report, the attempts to define environmental migrants proved in fact that this 
problem is situated at the intersection of different policy sectors, each one with its one rationality, 
objectives and functioning. The environmental causes of the problem require the involvement of the 
environmental sector, both at the national and international level. The consequences of the problem are 
not, however, only environmental; according to the dominant discourse, they relate to the humanitarian 
sector (human suffering) or to the security sector (risk for conflict). In other words, the gravity of the 
problem is not justified with reference to ecological crisis but with reference to the human conditions of 
living and survival.  
Figure 1  
Environmental Migrants (EM) : 
Problem, Cause or Consequence?
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The environmental policy network comprises actors traditionally in charge of combating environmental 
deterioration (UNEP, environmental NGOs, Departments of the Environment, etc.). It is not by accident 
that the term ‘environmental refugee’ emerged for the first time on the international arena in the El- 
Hinnawi report published by United Nations.Environmental Programme (UNEP). The policy network 
competent on the humanitarian and security issues comprises very different actors with no environmental 
competences (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), International 
Organizations for Migration (IOM), Ministries of Interior and  Foreign Affairs, humanitarian NGOs, etc). 
Important incompatibilities separate these groups of actors, making their collaboration difficult. More 
specifically, the environmental sector was built in the 1970s on an ecocentric approach to reality against 
the anthropocentric approach dominant until then (Theys, 2005). The environment constitutes a new 
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autonomous social value that must be protected in itself and not, as in the past, through reference to 
human health. The new environmental policies are based on the responsibility concept operationalised by 
the "polluter-payer" principle. They also refer to the prevention and precautionary principles which 
express the need for decision-makers to anticipate harm to the public or to the environment.  
The humanitarian as well as the security sectors are built on an anthropocentric approach to reality. This 
involves giving priority to human well-being. Humanitarian and security policies are urgent responses to 
human crisis situations, and as such, they can not be based on the individual responsibility concept. 
Costs are shared by the community. 
From what precedes, it becomes apparent that very different public policies can be adopted in order to 
deal with EM according to the policy sectors involved. The environmental sector concentrates primarily on 
the causes of the problem. It proposes either ex ante policy measures in order to prevent environmental 
degradation or ex post restoration measures, asking the polluters to internalise the cost of pollution in 
order to mitigate environmental degradation. The humanitarian sector focuses on the consequences of 
the problem by proposing ex post measures of relief through the collectivisation of the induced costs. The 
security sector concentrates on the prevention and/or regulation of migration flows. 
Neither the objectives (environmental protection vs human protection) nor the means (constraint and 
sanction, help and inducement) are common to these sectors of public action. Stone (1987) rightly affirms 
that a problem is never defined on the public agenda in all its dimensions. It always passes through a 
process of simplification that reduces the scope of the problem and makes it more manageable. This is 
occurring in recent attempts to restrictively redefine environmental migrants as climate migrants. This 
redefinition focuses attention on the biggest sub-category of environmentally displaced people, but it runs 
the risk of diluting the problem within the very large issue of climate change and making the discourse on 
migration much less audible.  
4. FROM ENVIRONMENTAL TO CLIMATE MIGRANTS 
The different numbers of environmental migrants and the approaches and sectors involved push the 
actors to seek clarification of the term. This evolves through a process of inclusion and exclusion which, 
finally defines both the content of policy ie those to be protected by policy measures, and at the same 
time those who are competent to make policy. Different arenas of discussion mostly point to climate 
migrants by putting aside all other cases of environmental displacement (Felli, 2008). We notice that 
European Greens concentrate the debate exclusively on climate migrants3. This is also the case within 
various U.N. agencies. 
I suggest that this process in progress takes the form of a “double fault” of agenda setting. On the one 
hand, it excludes from the public debate all other categories of population suffering from environmental 
crises that cannot hope any more for protection and compensation (industrial accidents, dam 
construction, war…). On the other hand, the good position that climate change has on the political 
agenda does not seem to benefit the environmental migrants as the advocates of this alignment would 
have hoped. Paradoxically, the annexation of the problem to the climate change issue tends to slow down 
the effort to consider environmental migration as an autonomous public problem.  
Pushed by the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change is 
imposed on the national and international agendas as a major public concern. Important human and 
financial resources are engaged both for research and policy making, but the way this issue is being 
defined does not leave any place for discussion on migration.  
                                          
3
 See Conference on Climate Refugees at the European Parliament, the 11 June 2008 and subsequent Declaration.  
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Historically, since 1992 the policy to combat the climate change has passed from a traditional 
environmental approach to a development-oriented approach. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol provide binding agreements for the 
reduction of GHG emissions (mitigation strategy). However, this environmental approach has so far 
proved to be insufficient not only due to the lack of engagement by certain big GHG-emitter countries but 
also in relation to the inappropriate application of the emissions trading system. Therefore the discourse 
on mitigation has started to weaken giving place to another policy-oriented discourse concentrating on 
adaptation strategies.  
The decade following the first IPCC Assessment report saw significant evolution of climate change 
impacts and adaptation research, due to a number of factors (Smit et al., 2000). As pointed out in the 
report of the Canadian Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Program, there was growing evidence 
that climate change was already occurring. Impacts could no longer be seen as hypothetical outcomes 
but instead needed to be addressed as imminent concerns. Further, it had become apparent that 
mitigation could not prevent climate change from occurring even if stabilisation of carbon dioxide were 
achieved. Thus the international climate change community considered adaptation as a principal policy 
objective. This shift in attitude is reflected in the changing titles of the three IPCC Working Group II 
assessment reports completed between 1990 and 2001 : 1990: Impacts Assessment of Climate Change ; 
1995: Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation of Climate Change ; 2001 and 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability.4 The emphasis is consequently put on the most vulnerable regions, which generally 
coincide with the poorest regions lacking the necessary infrastructures to cope with the effects of global 
warming (droughts, floods, extreme weather events). In other words, the environmental policies no longer 
appear as the principal response to the problem. Development projects offering improved resilience to 
vulnerable regions become the principle instrument for climate policy today.  
In that context, the main policy actors are to be found in the development sector and not in the 
environmental and humanitarian sectors. As indicated by humanitarian agents, '”the logic of development 
policies does not meet the logic of humanitarian policies”. This is not the case for the environment which - 
since the Rio Conference - has no longer been seen as an enemy but as a partner for (sustainable) 
development. The concept of sustainable development reflects, however, the integration of the 
environment into the need for development and not vice versa5. This evolution towards development- 
oriented policies which put the emphasis on adaptation to deal with climate change slows down the 
efforts to define environmental migration as a new global public issue. In fact, adaptation strategies are in 
contradiction with the recognition of this issue: taking into account environmental migrants means 
anticipating the insufficiency of adaptation efforts. In other words, in a context where adaptation becomes 
the key strategy for climate policy, environmental migrants become a non issue6. 
5. TOWARDS A MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM?  
According to the discussion above, two different strategies have been developed the last twenty years by 
the advocates of people who need to leave their traditional homelands because of an environmental 
disruption. The first consists of seeking a broad definition including all kinds of environmental causes of 
displacement. The second strategy tends to promote a restrictive definition of ‘climate’ migrants. In both 
cases, the shift from discourse to action has not succeeded for multiple reasons, leaving people suffering 
from environmental problems without systematic assistance.  
                                          
4
 http://www.adaptation.nrcan.gc.ca 
5We do not enter here into the debate relating to the no-growth movement as formulated by Georgescu-Roegen  (1979), or more 
recently  by Christophe  (2007). I want only to emphasise the fact that the notion of sustainable development imposes an implicit 
hierarchy between development and the environment. 
6Personal interviews allowed us to note the non-consideration of the question of migration during the discussions and research on 
adaptation strategies. 
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The effort to impose a broad definition meets with an unfavourable political and economic context, 
pushing European states to close their borders and restrain the migration flows. Paradoxically, the 
alarmist discourse on the future millions of environmental migrants does not stimulate a call for immediate 
action but rather strengthens the tendency to control migration. At the same time, the multiple figures of 
environmental migrants mean that the public is unclear about who the environmental migrants really are. 
The restrictive definition, as mentioned above, leads to the incorporation of the migration issue into 
climate change policy. This constitutes to some extent an ex-ante problem solving inasmuch as the 
dominant approach consists of helping the regions to adapt to change, so that people do not see 
themselves forced to flee their homelands. Although in this case the migrants' portrait appears to be 
clearer and concreter, the alignment between migration and climate change tends to exclude the former 
issue from the political agenda and to strengthen the importance of the latter.  
Renaud et al. (2007) rightly affirm that ‘scientific “concerns” instead of the pragmatic application of a 
precautionary principle paralyse both the scientific and the policy making communities’. They propose 
then to distinguish between different sub-classes of environment-related displacements in order to better 
understand the urgency of the assistance that is needed. The criterion of classification is in this case the 
nature of the environmental degradation. The concern for a pragmatic approach to the problem needs 
also to take into account the compatibleness and rationality of the sectors addressing the policy to be 
adopted. Therefore, we propose to separate the problem into sub-issues corresponding to the 
specificities of the different relevant sectors.  
The strategies proposed until now concentrate on the most conflicting dimension of the policy process: 
the problem definition. They ask, as a first step, to officially recognise a specific status offering protection 
and compensation to EM. This eminently political process is accompanied by strong media coverage, and 
political and institutional conflicts paralyse negotiations for future policy making. The fragmentation of the 
problem in sub-issues divides the negotiation framework into smaller and more integrated policy 
communities that can facilitate the debate and the adoption of concrete measures. This does not involve 
an overall agreement but rather multiple compromises within the various sectors concerned. These 
compromises may go in the direction of adjustments to existing policy instruments. In this way, they could 
also respond to the needs of environmental migrants. 
A sector relevant criterion to carry out the division of the problem is the possibility or not to identify those 
to blame for environmental disruption and allocate the compensation costs to them. The application of 
this criterion to the environmental causes of migration listed by Lonergan (1998) distributes the different 
environmental crises to three more or less separate arenas of negotiation. 
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Figure 2  
Sectoral division of
Policy Making
Environnemental 
Degradation
Natural Disaster
Environmental
Persecution
Polluer’s 
responsibility
No allocation of
responsibility
Responsibility
denial
Problem
Components
Environmental
Sector
Humanitarian
Sector
Asylum
Sector
Policy SectorsResponsibility
Displaced
Persons
+
Action
Victims
+
Compensation
Disaster-
victims
+
Assistance
Refugees
+
Asylum
C.A. Vlassopoulos, 2008
 
This table presents 3 cases of responsibility allocation: the case where the actors behind environmental 
disruption are more or less identifiable and forced to assume the costs of the damage; the case where the 
attribution of responsibility is impossible; and finally, the case where actors are identifiable, but their 
responsibility is not assumed. In each one of these cases, the response mechanism to displaced 
populations differs, the qualification of people affected is different, and the measures to engage are 
different (Vlassopoulos, 2008).  
In the first case (environmental degradation), polluters are recognised, and the official authorities can 
organise a compensation system7. This case includes many of the causes of environmental 
displacement:  
- Desertification is a problem above all attributed to human activity (overexploitation of the land, 
persistence of inadequate farming practices…), and worsened by certain natural phenomena like long 
periods of drought - partly also related to human behaviour.  
- Deforestation is also a problem involving human behaviour (overexploitation of the forest resources, 
transformation of wooded land into agricultural fields, voluntary fires).  
- Climate change is attributed today, mainly to the human activity. 
- Industrial accidents mostly have quite clearly identifiable polluters.  
                                          
7 Bates (2002) proposes to differentiate between polluting activities that intentionally produce migration and activities that 
unintentionally produce migration. This distinction risks introducing  a soft framework within which polluters could easily escape from 
their responsibilities. 
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All of these problems have generated international agreements (Convention to Combat Desertification, 
Convention on Biodiversity, Climate Convention, Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents…). Those agreements identify the victims as well as the polluters who have to assume the 
costs of the environmental damage. In that sense, they can be mobilised to respond to the needs of 
environmental migrants. This will require, however, a shift towards a less ecocentric vision of the reality, 
recognising human rights and dignity (not only human health stricto sensu) as objects protected by the 
environmental rules.  
In the second case (natural disasters), there is no allocation of responsibility, because environmental 
disruption and migration are the result of natural events. The question here is where to locate the 
boundary line between natural origin and anthropogenic origin. Only earthquakes and volcanic eruptions 
seem clearly to be natural disasters. An answer can only come from a high level political discussion which 
will unavoidably simplify reality. This distinction is necessary not only for the clarification of competences 
between agencies but also for the share of financing between a ‘polluter compensation fund’ and a 
‘humanitarian relief fund’. 
The third case (environmental persecution) concerns responsibility denial on behalf of the drivers of the 
environmental disruption (most of the time political authorities) and the incapacity of the international 
community to oblige them to assist the victims. This case includes dam construction which generates 
mass population displacements not always protected by their authorities. It also includes strategic 
deterioration of the environment during armed conflict. In both cases, it is possible to consider that the 
people affected cannot count on the assistance of their governments, and thus, they can be considered 
as being persecuted. Therefore, the asylum sector needs to engage in discussions about the way to 
reinterpret the Geneva Convention in order to give these populations 'refugee' status. This will require a 
shift towards a less anthropocentric vision of the reality, recognising the environment as a cause of 
human suffering8. 
In some extreme cases like the disappearance of a country caused by a serious and irremediable 
deterioration of its environment, the same mechanisms could be mobilised. If the convention on apatrids 
(i.e. persons unable to certify their nationality) obtains greater recognition within the international 
community, it could also serve as a means to assist those people. In that direction, the report of the 
Executive Committee for the programme of the High Commissioner on the apatrids in 2006 encouraged 
better mobilisation for the identification, prevention, reduction and protection of stateless persons. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This contribution contests the thesis which claims that the environment is not a real cause of migration, 
and therefore, specific protection is not justified for people experiencing environmental stress. The 
environmental deterioration causes human and ecological suffering. Prevention as well as assistance and 
compensation are needed, regardless of the number of persons concerned. The decision to impose a 
specific status for environmental migrants would probably be the best solution. But both, the socio-
economic context and the multidimensional content of the issue seriously decrease the feasibility of this 
solution. Restrictively pointing to climate migrants not only excludes from the public debate all other 
categories of population suffering from environmental deterioration but also, paradoxically, slow down the 
effort to consider environmental migration as an autonomous public problem. 
The response to inaction could be a more fragmented policy making process that fits better into the 
traditional institutional divisions and rationalities. Dividing the issue into different more homogenous 
arenas of negotiation with specific competences can push forward the debate and lead to compromises. 
                                          
8 The recent article signed by the High Commissioner for Refugees, A. Guterres, last October goes in that direction by recognizing 
that ”some movements likely to be prompted by climate change could indeed fall within the traditional refugee law framework”. 
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Giving clear answers to complex problems is not a feasible target. Simplification is always necessary in 
the public sphere in order for the agenda setting process and policy formation to succeed. 
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